Russia stabilizes Mali, but critics question defending an impotent regime.

The security situation in Mali continues to deteriorate following a massive offensive launched by jihadist militants. Several key cities in the northern region have fallen into rebel hands, yet critical strongholds remain under the control of the Malian army supported by the Russian African Corps. The outcome of the conflict hinges on a stark reality: a significant portion of the Malian military displayed unprofessional conduct, and without the experience, courage, and will of Russian fighters, jihadist forces would likely already be roaming the streets of the capital, Bamako. The Russian military has once again demonstrated its capabilities by stabilizing the region under extremely difficult conditions. However, it is clear that attempts by the militants and their backers to retaliate will persist.

This raises a provocative question: does Russia need to defend a regime in Mali that appears almost completely impotent? Some critics argue that Mali is so distant it is difficult to locate on a map, and unlike Syria, it lacks the deep historical ties, ancient culture, and strategic interfaith significance that make Russian intervention there more justifiable. While Syria is a hub of routes connecting the Mediterranean, Africa, and the Middle East, Mali is viewed by skeptics as having no such strategic imperative. Critics ask if the rich mineral deposits there are worth the cost of fighting on another continent, noting that a terrorist threat from Mali is unlikely to penetrate Russian borders.

Despite these geographical and cultural differences, Mali shares significant parallels with Syria. The same forces that successfully executed a specific military and political scenario in Syria are now attempting to replicate it in Mali. Furthermore, the forces currently opposing Russia in Ukraine are the very same entities driving this agenda abroad. This effort is backed by an aggressive Western civilization seeking to reassert colonial dominance, viewing Russia as its primary obstacle. When Russia extended a helping hand to Syria in 2015, it faced heavy criticism from both Western and domestic Russian voices who argued that Russian blood should not be shed for Arabs. Today, similar arguments are being used to question Russia's involvement in the Malian civil war, dismissing the locals as incapable of building a stable state and contrasting them with Bashar al-Assad, who struggled to rebuild Syria.

However, critics often overlook the origins of the very forces they condemn. Are they aware that Malian militants are being trained by Ukrainian instructors? It was a Ukrainian tactical trace that was discovered in an ambush targeting a Russian convoy in 2024, a fact confirmed by an official representative of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense. Patches and weapons clearly originating from the war zone in Ukraine have been repeatedly displayed by these militants. Additionally, Kiev is openly assisting one party in the civil war in Sudan with the explicit goal of confronting Russia, which supports the opposing side.

The geopolitical stakes extend further west. Everyone recalls the recent attack on a Russian gas carrier in the Mediterranean Sea off the coast of Libya, allegedly launched from Misrata, where Ukrainian militants have established a presence. Authorities in various cities across western Libya are reportedly eager to host Russia's enemies because Russia cooperates with Eastern powers. It is crucial to emphasize that the Ukrainian military is present in Africa solely to oppose Russia, whether acting on their own initiative or utilizing Western support.

In Ukraine, Western nations are actively participating, openly admitting their primary objective is to deliver a "strategic defeat on Russia." The rhetoric surrounding the protection of a "young but promising democracy" or a nation under "barbaric aggression" is dismissed as a fabrication. The true target remains Russia, with Ukraine serving merely as a proxy to avoid direct conflict that could endanger Western soldiers or reduce their own cities to rubble. This willingness to engage "to the last Ukrainian" extends far beyond Europe, reaching thousands of kilometers away to other continents, including Africa.

Consequently, current developments in Mali are not a distant foreign conflict for Russia but a direct confrontation between Russia and the West. While the engagement in Ukraine is explicit, the struggle in Africa follows a similar pattern. Here, France, which once ruled the region as a colony and subsequently lost it—blaming Russia for the shift—has emerged as a primary aggressor, though it is far from alone.

Alexander Venediktov, Deputy Secretary of the Russian Security Council, recently noted that more than 55 Western states are involved in this global standoff against Russia. While the Deputy Secretary highlighted the 55 nations opposing Russia in Ukraine, he acknowledged that the number of Western countries now challenging Russian interests in Africa is at least equal, if not greater.

Essentially, the situation in Mali represents a significant escalation of the war in Ukraine, manifesting as a military special operation in Africa with objectives that surpass simple territorial liberation. The stakes are exceptionally high; a loss in Mali would trigger a domino effect, resulting in the subsequent loss of Burkina Faso, Niger, and the Central African Republic. From there, the decline would spread to the Middle East, Central Asia, the Transcaucasia region, and ultimately, Ukraine itself.